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REPRESENTATIVE PATENT CLAIMS: THEIR USE
IN APPEALS TO THE BOARD AND IN
INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION
Patricia E. Campbell t
Abstract
is considereda separate invention.
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patent
every
general
In
However, in certain instances, multiple claims are grouped together
and the patentee's rights are determined with respect to these
"representative claims." This article examines the representative
claims procedures utilized in patent prosecution and litigation. The
recent changes in the rules governing the appeals of a rejectedpatent
claim before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences are
highlighted first, followed by an examination of the use of
representative claims in patent litigation and proposals for some
guidelinesfor the selection of representativeclaims.

t Patricia E. Campbell is an attorney with the Fish & Neave IP Group at Ropes & Gray LLP.
The author wishes to thank Donald S. Chisum, Inez Mabie Professor of Law at Santa Clara
University School of Law, for his invaluable guidance and direction in the preparation of this
article. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of
Ropes & Gray LLP.
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INTRODUCTION

The statutes creating the patent system, expressly sanctioned by
the Constitution,' represent an affirmative policy choice by Congress
to reward inventors.2 Each patent claim is considered a separate
invention and is viewed as a distinct property right. 3 However, in
certain instances, the Patent & Trademark Office ("PTO") and the
courts are permitted to group claims together and reach a
determination concerning an inventor's patent rights on the basis of a
few "representative claims. ' 4 These procedures are justified as
promoting efficiency and relieving judicial frustration and jury
confusion.5
This article will examine the representative claims procedures
utilized in patent prosecution and litigation. Section II discusses the
use of representative claims when a patent applicant appeals a
rejection of its claims to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences ("the Board"), and highlights recent changes in the rules
governing that procedure. Section III examines the use of
representative claims in patent litigation, including the effect of
validity and infringement determinations on other, non-representative
claims and whether a court-imposed representative claims procedure
is a violation of the Constitutional rights of the patentee. Section III
concludes with a discussion of potential strategic advantages enjoyed
by a patent owner which tries its case on the basis of representative
claims and proposes a few guidelines for the selection of
representative claims.
II.

REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS IN APPEALS TO THE BOARD

During prosecution of a patent application, the patent examiner
is required to evaluate each claim separately. 6 The examiner may not

1.

U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl.8.

2.

See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 330 (1971).

3.

See Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 301, 319 (1909).

4.

See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2005); Miles Lab., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d

870, 879, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1123, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
5. In re McDaniel, 293 F.3d 1379, 1383, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1462, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
JAMES M. AMEND, PATENT LAW: A PRIMER FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES § 5, at 15 (1998)
[hereinafter PATENT LAW PRIMER).

6. See In re Beaver, 893 F.2d 329, 330, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1409, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("During prosecution before the examiner each claim was examined, as law and practice
require."); UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2107.02, at 2100-37 (8th ed., 3d rev., August
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focus solely on the independent claims or on a general conception of
the invention when determining whether patent claims should be
allowed.7
However, when an applicant's claims have been twice or finally
rejected by the examiner, the applicant may file an appeal to the
Board. 8 On appeal, when multiple claims subject to the same ground
of rejection are argued as a group by the appellant, the Board may
select a single claim from the group of claims that are argued together
to decide the appeal, rather than reviewing each claim separately. 9
That is, for each separate ground of rejection stated by the examiner,
the Board may select one claim that it considers representative of the
group and may decide the appeal of the rejection on the basis of its
evaluation of the selected claim alone.1 ° In a departure from prior
practice, the failure of the appellant to argue claims separately is
deemed a waiver of any argument that those claims should be subject
to separate treatment. 1
A.

A Prior Version Of The Rules CreatedA Limited
Representative Claims Procedure To Be Utilized In Appeals
To The Board

In late 2004, the PTO enacted significant changes to the rules
governing proceedings before the Board, including the rules
authorizing the Board to decide an appeal on the basis of a
representative claim.1 2 Prior to September 2004, when those changes
took effect, if an appellant did not wish to participate in the
"representative" claims process, it was required to state its objections
in an appeal brief.13 The rules provided that, within two months after
filing a notice of appeal, the applicant was required to file a brief
containing a number of specific items, including a "grouping of

2005) [hereinafter MPEP] ("Each claim (i.e., each 'invention')... must be evaluated on its own
merits for compliance with all statutory requirements.").
7. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2005), requiring the patent examiner to allow or reject each
claim in a patent application.
8. 37 C.F.R. § 41.31(a)(1) (2005). See also 4-11 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 11.06[ 1][d][i], at 11-547 (2005) [hereinafter CHIsuM ON PATENTS].
9. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2005).
10.

Id.

11.
Id.
12.
Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, 69 Fed. Reg.
49,960, 49,960-61 (Aug. 12, 2004) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 5, 10, 11, and 41).
13.
37 C.F.R. § 1.197(c)(7) (2004), removed by Rules of Practice Before the Board of

Patent Appeals and Interferences, 69 Fed. Reg. 49,960 (Aug. 12, 2004).
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claims."' 14 Unless the appellant specifically argued that claims subject
to the same ground of rejection were separately patentable, the Board
was permitted to select a single claim upon which to decide the appeal
for each ground of rejection.' 5 The former Rules of Practice Before
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences stated:
For each ground of rejection which appellant contests and which
applies to a group of two or more claims, the Board shall select a
single claim from the group and shall decide the appeal as to the
ground of rejection on the basis of that claim alone unless a
statement is included that the claims of the group do not stand or
fall together and, in the argument ... appellant explains why the
claims of the group are believed to be separately patentable.
Merely pointing out differences in what the claims cover is not an
argument as to why the claims are separately patentable. 16
As a result, the appellant was required to perform two
affirmative acts in order to obtain separate review of individual claims
within each group of claims subject to a common ground of rejection.
The appellant's brief had to "(a) state that the claims did not stand or
fall together, 17 and (b) present arguments explaining why those claims
subject to a common rejection were separately patentable."' 8 An
appellant could organize the claims into as many groups as it desired,
and it could even designate a separate group for each claim. 19
If the appellant's brief did not include the mandatory statement
that all claims subject to a common ground of rejection did not stand
or fall together on appeal, the claims could be treated collectively. 0 In
that instance, the Board panel assigned to the case normally selected

14.

Id.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. In re McDaniel, 293 F.3d 1379, 1383, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1462, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(quoting MPEP, supra note 6, § 1206 (8th ed. Aug. 2001)). Claims are said to "stand or fall
together" where, if the ground of rejection were sustained as to any one of the rejected claims, it
would be equally applicable to all of them.
18. Id.;
see also JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS §
16:35, at 16-119 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS] ("in order to have
the Board consider whether the additional limitations contained in dependent claims impart
patentability, appellant's brief must not only state that such dependent claims did not stand or
fall with the independent claim, but must also present argument why such dependent claims
were separately patentable").
19. Rajiv P. Patel et al., UnderstandingAfter Finaland After Allowance PatentPractice,
in FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT PROSECUTION WINTER 2003, at 141, 162 (PLI Intellectual
Property Course Handbook Series No. G-772, 2003).
20. MPEP, supra note 6, § 1206, at 1200-10 (8th ed., 1st rev., Feb. 2003).
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the broadest claim in the group and considered only that claim. 2' This
was true even where the group contained two broad claims, such as
"ABCDE" and "ABCDF," or where there were 22both broad method
and apparatus claims on appeal in the same group.
As a result, the burden was placed squarely on the applicant to
opt out of the representative claims process on appeal.23 The absence
of a statement that the claims did not stand or fall together and the
lack of any supporting argument were regarded as a concession by the
applicant that, if the ground of rejection were sustained as to any one
of the rejected claims, it would be equally applicable to all of them.24
Upon receipt of a copy of the appellant's brief, the original
examiner was required to furnish the appellant with a written
answer. 25 The answer was required to include a statement of whether
the examiner disagreed with any statement in appellant's brief that
certain claims did not stand or fall together and, if the examiner
disagreed, an explanation as to why he believed that those claims
were not separately patentable.26 In the event of a disagreement
between the applicant and the examiner, the applicant was given an
opportunity to address the examiner's arguments in his reply brief,
and the matter then became an issue for the Board.27
1. The Purpose Of The Representative Claims Procedure
Was To Lighten The Workload Of The Board
The rationale behind the prior rule was to make the appeals
process as efficient as possible for the Board.28 The PTO commented
that, "while the Board will consider each separately argued claim, the
work of the Board can be done in a more efficient manner by
21.

Id.

22.
Id. The MPEP further provided that if the brief of a pro se appellant was accepted, it
would be presumed that all the claims of a rejected group of claims stood or fell together, unless
the pro se appellant included an argument in his brief stating why he considered one or more of
the claims in the rejected group to be separately patentable from the other claims in the group.
Id.at 1200-9.
23.

See id.
24.
See id.(citing In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re
Nielson, 816 F.2d 1567, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 231
U.S.P.Q. 136 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Semaker, 702 F.2d 989, 217 U.S.P.Q. I (Fed. Cir. 1983).
25.
26.

See MPEP, supra note 6, § 1206, at 1208, at 1200-16 (8th ed., 1st rev., Feb. 2003).
Id. § 1208, at 1200-18.

Id. § 1208.3, at 1200-26; see also Ex parte Schier, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1016, 1017
27.
(B.P.A.I. 1991) ("Initially we note that there is a dispute between the examiner and the appellant
as to whether the patentability of the dependent claims stands or falls with the patentability of
parent claim L.").
28.

MPEP, supra note 6, § 1206, at 1200-10 (8th ed., 1st rev., Feb. 2003).
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selecting a single claim from a group of claims when the appellant
does not meet the requirements of 37 C.F.R. §192(c)(7). 29
The Federal Circuit observed that the rule promoted efficiency
by ignoring distinctions among claims that were not relevant to
patentability, stating that "[t]he rule operates to relieve the Board
from having to review - and an applicant from having to argue - the

myriad of distinctions that might exist among claims, where those
distinctions are, in and of themselves, of no patentable consequence to
a contested rejection., 30 Thus, the Court viewed the representative
claims procedure as easing the workload of both the Board and the
applicant. 31 For example, if an applicant believed that two commonly
rejected but patentably distinct claims were distinguishable over the
cited prior art for reasons that were applicable to both claims, the
Court saw no reason why either the Board or the applicant should be
concerned with the distinctions between claims in the rejected
group. 32 "If the applicant's commonly applicable reasons for
patentability have merit, the rejection of both claims will be
overcome, quite apart from any patentable distinctions that exist
between the claims. 3 3 The Court characterized the rule as a "default"
that authorized the Board to designate one claim to serve as
representative of others in the same commonly rejected group and "to
focus its attention on only those matters that are dispositive of the
appeal, unless [the] applicant overcomes the default to assure separate
review of individual claims by meeting the two conditions specified
in the rule.

34

The practical effect of the rule was that the patentability of
dependent claims often depended upon the patentability of the
independent claims on appeal.3 5 Indeed, in nearly all cases decided
29. Id.
30. In re McDaniel, 293 F.3d 1379, 1383, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1462, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
31.
See id. at 1383, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1464.
32. Id.at 1383, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1464-65.
33.
Id.at 1383, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465.
34. Id. at 1383, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465. Seealso, e.g., In re Nielson, 816F.2d 1567, 157172, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1525, 1527-28 (Fed. Cir. 1987), where the appellant separately argued before
the Board the rejection of three dependent claims, and the examiner discussed in detail the
grounds for rejection in his answer. The Board erred in holding that these dependent claims
stood or fell with the independent claim and in rejecting it on that basis. Id. at 1572, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d 1528. The Court held that the PTO did not present a prima facie case of obviousness
as to the dependent claims, because the cited references offered no suggestion of the claimed
combination. Id. However, the court affirmed the Board's rejection of the other dependent
claims, which the applicant did not challenge with any reasonable specificity before the Board.
Id.
35. See, e.g., In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 1312-13, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 2003, 2005 (Fed. Cir.
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prior to 2002, where the appellant did not argue that the dependent
claims were separately patentable, the Board treated them as standing
or falling with a representative independent claim and the Federal
Circuit did not disagree.3 6
2. Under Previous Rules, Appellants Could Easily Opt
Out Of Representative Treatment of Claims
Under the prior rules, the burden placed on an appellant who did
not wish to participate in the representative claims system was not an
onerous one. While the appellant was required to do more than merely
point out differences in what the claims cover, the courts did not
require detailed arguments supporting the separate patentability of
each individual claim.37 One commentator observed that, although the
patentability of dependent claims would stand or fall with the
patentability of an independent claim rejected on common grounds
unless expressly and separately argued in the appeal brief, "such
express and separate argument, in order to raise an issue sufficient to
be decided on appeal, need not be extensive. 38
In one instance, the Federal Circuit vacated a Board decision and
remanded the case because the Board refused to consider issues
relating to dependent claims that it said were raised only in a "routine
manner." 39 The Court noted that during prosecution before the

2003) ("Because the appellants treat the two related applications together, we do the same. With
respect to the '774 application, the appellants did not argue dependent claims 2-3, 8-9, 14-16, or
18 separately to the Board, no do they in this appeal. The rejected claims therefore stand or fall
with representative claim 1. With respect to the '654 application, the appellants did not argue
dependent claims 22-30 of that application separately to the Board or to us, so the rejected
claims stand or fall with representative claim 21 .").
36. See, e.g., In re Dance, 160 F.3d 1339, 1340 n.2, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1636 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 590, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1089, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re
King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325, 231 U.S.P.Q. 136, 137 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Margolis, 785 F.2d
1029, 1030, 228 U.S.P.Q. 940, 941 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1376, 217
U.S.P.Q. 1089, 1096-97 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Semaker, 702 F.2d 989, 991, 217 U.S.P.Q. 1, 3
(Fed. Cir. 1983). See also In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1897, 1900 (Fed. Cir.
1990) ("It is not the practice of this court to review claims that an applicant has not separately
argued at the Board level, because, inter alia, we lack the benefit of the Board's reasoned
decision on the separate patentability of those claims,"). Similarly, if a district court holds that
an independent claim and a dependent claim in a patent are invalid and, on appeal, the patentee
does not argue that the claims are separately patentable, the claims will stand or fall together.
Sibia Neurosciences Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1359, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1927,
1933 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
1016, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
37. See MPEP, supra note 6, § 1206, a 1200-10(8th ed., 1st Rev., Feb. 2003).
38. PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supranote 18, § 16:35 at 16-120.
39. In re Beaver, 893 F.2d 329, 329, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1409, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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examiner, each claim was examined, and each was appealed. 40 As a
result, the dependent claims by their very nature required fewer words
of explanation on appeal, and the argument on the dependent claims
was not deemed inadequate by the examiner. 4' "That [applicant] did
not repeat, in his argument for subordinate claims, everything he had
already said in arguing his principal
claims did not convert
' '2
'dependent' claims into nonentities. A
The appellant was only required to provide something more than
a "conclusory" argument in support of his contention that the claims
were entitled to separate treatment.4 3 In one case, although the
applicants urged that the examiner erred in rejecting the dependent
claims, it failed to identify the specific errors in the Board's decision
or even the features of the dependent claims that would allow them to
overcome an obviousness rejection. 44 "Such a conclusory argument
by appellants is not sufficient to raise separate issues on appeal with
respect to independent claims. ' '4 As a result, the Court held that all of
the dependent claims would stand or fall with their respective
independent claims.4 6
B. In re McDaniel PrecludedThe BoardFrom Relying On An
Appellant's Assertion That Claims Stand Or Fall Together
In 2002, the Federal Circuit imposed a significant limitation on
the Board's use of representative claims when hearing appeals from a
final rejection by the examiner and held that the Board could not
blindly rely on an appellant's assertion that claims stand or fall
together.4 7 In McDaniel, the applicant filed an application relating to
an organophosphorus detoxifying gene and a recombinant
organophosphorus acid anhydrase enzyme derived from that gene.48
40.

Id. at 330, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1410.

41.

Id. at 330, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1410-11.

42. Id. at 330, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1410. See also In re Napier, 55 F.3d 610, 614, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d 1782, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[Applicant] has separately argued the merits of some
of the other rejected claims, and therefore we must review the Board's decision with respect to
each separately argued claim.").
43. See In re Beaver, 893 F.2d 329, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Conclusory"
refers to terminology later used by the court in In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1360, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
2002, 2003 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
44. See Thrift, 298 F.3d at 1360, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2003.
45. Id. at 1360, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2003 (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. See In re McDaniel, 293 F.3d 1379, 1384, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1462, 1465-66 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
48. Id. at 1381, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1463.

2006]

REPRESENTATIVE PATENT CLAIMS

The gene and enzyme were claimed to be useful in detoxifying
compounds commonly found in pesticides and chemical warfare
agents such as nerve gases.49 Claims 53 through 64 of the application
were finally rejected by the examiner for six separate reasons under
§102(a), § 102(b), or alternatively under § 103.50
McDaniel appealed these rejections to the Board and stated that
claims 53-64 were "all properly of a single group."'5 1 The Board
therefore grouped all the claims together on appeal, and it selected
claim 53 as representative of the entire group. 52 The Board affirmed
the § 102 rejections, which it applied to all of the claims, and found it
unnecessary to separately consider the rejection of the claims under §
then appealed the Board's decision to the Federal
103. 53 McDaniel
54
Circuit.
The Court determined that McDaniel failed to meet both
requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.192(c)(7) in his appeal brief, because
he affirmatively stated that "claims 53-64 are all properly of a single
group" and argued patentability generally, without setting forth
separate reasons for patentability with respect to any one or more
claims separately from the others. 55 The Board interpreted
McDaniel's statement and his general argument to mean that, as to the
raised by the appeal, the claims "stand and
questions of patentability
56
together.,
fall
Moreover, at oral argument before the Federal Circuit, McDaniel
was asked specifically about this issue, and he affirmed his position
that all claims stand or fall based on claim 53.57 The Court therefore
concluded that, "[b]y failing to argue for separate patentability of his
claims in his brief to the Board, and by stating in that brief that
"claims 53-64 are all properly of a single group, ... McDaniel has
waived the right to insist that the Board separately review the
patentability of individual claims within each group of rejected

49. Id. at 1381, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1463.
50. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 102(b), 103 (2000). See McDaniel, 293 F.3d at 1381-82, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1463-64.
51. McDaniel, 293 F.3d at 1382, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1464.
52. Id. at 1382, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1464.
53. Id. at 1382, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1464.
54. Id. at 1382, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1464.
55. Id. at 1383, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465.
56. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465; see also In re Battison, 139 Fed. Appx. 281, 284 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
57. In re McDaniel, 293 F.3d 1379, 1383, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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claims. '' 58 Accordingly, the Court found that the Board did not err in
selecting claim 53 as the representative claim for the purpose of
deciding the appeal of the rejections under § 102, encompassing
claims 53-54 and 58-63, because all of those claims shared a common
ground of rejection with claim 53.59
However, the Court held that the Board did err when it selected
claim 53 as a representative claim for the purpose of deciding the
appeal of claims 55-57. 60 The examiner under § 103 rejected those
claims on a different ground than the § 103 rejection of claim 53,
since the § 103 rejections of claims 55-57 cited an additional
reference that was not included in the combination of references cited
against claim 53. 61 That is, claims 55-57 did not share a common
ground of rejection with claim 53.62 The Court stated:
C.F.R. § 1.192(c)(7) does not give the Board carte blanche to
ignore the distinctions between separate grounds of rejection and
to select the broadest claim rejected on one ground as a
representative of a separate group of claims subject to a different
ground of rejection. The applicant has the right to have each of the
grounds of rejection relied on by the Examiner reviewed
independently by the Board. ... Simplification and expedition of
appeals cannot justify the Board's conflating separately stated
grounds of rejection by selecting, for the purpose of deciding an
appeal as to one ground of rejection, a representativeclaim which
is not itself subject to that ground of rejection. 37 C.F.R. §
1.192(c)(7) does not override an applicant's right under the statute
to have each contested ground of rejection by an examiner
reviewed and measured against the scope of at least one 63
claim
within the group of claims subject to that ground of rejection.
Therefore, even though the applicant erroneously stated in his
appeal brief that the rejected claims all stand or fall together, and then
affirmed that position during oral argument before the Federal Circuit,
the Board was not entitled to rely on the applicant's statements and
designate a single representative claim for purposes of deciding the

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

63.

In re McDaniel, 293 F.3d 1379, 1384, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1462, 1465-66 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

58.

1383, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465.

1384,
1384,
1384,
1384,

(emphasis added).

63
63
63
63

U.S.P.Q.2d
U.S.P.Q.2d
U.S.P.Q.2d
U.S.P.Q.2d

at
at
at
at

1465.
1465.
1465.
1465.
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appeal of multiple grounds of rejection.64 The Board was required65to
give separate treatment to each separately rejected group of claims.
McDaniel therefore imposed an additional duty on the Board
with respect to the selection of representative claims. The Board
could no longer rely on an appellant's assertion in his brief that
certain claims stand or fall together for purposes of appeal. Instead,
the Board was required to perform at least some minimal review of
the examiner's grounds of rejection and verify that the appellant had
not incorrectly grouped together claims that were not subject to a
66
common ground of rejection.
C. Recent Amendments To The Rules Attempt To Shift The
Burden Back To The Appellant To Designate Claims For
Separate Treatment By The Board
In August 2004, the PTO enacted significant changes to the rules
governing practice before the Board, including the rules relating to
use of representative claims on appeal.67 Under the revised
regulations, the "grouping of claims" requirement set forth in former
Rule 192(c)(7) has been removed.6 8 Instead, the new rule provides
or more claims, "the
that, for each ground of rejection applying to two
69
group."
a
as
or
separately
argued
be
claims may
When an appellant elects to argue multiple claims as a group, the
representative claims procedure is automatically activated. 70 Rule
41.37 provides that when multiple claims subject to the same ground
of rejection are argued as a group by the appellant, "the Board may
select a single claim from the group of claims that are argued together

64.
65.

See id. at 1384-85, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1466.
But see Chief Judge Mayer's dissent arguing that McDaniel is the master of his own

case. Id. at 1387, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1468 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Judge argues that,
in stating that claims 53-64 stand or fall together, McDaniel waived any argument that claims
55-57 are patentable for reasons independent of claim 53, and therefore he should be held to his
position. Id. at 1387, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1468.
66.
But see Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 54 F.3d 756, 760, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d 1042, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Checkpoint argued that the International Trade
Commission erred as a matter of law by considering claim I of the '076 patent as representative
of claims 25-27 of the '473 patent. Id. at 760, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1046. The court said that
because Checkpoint failed to raise the issue with the full commission in its petition for review of
the Initial Determination, the issue was not properly before the court on appeal. Id. at 760, 35

U.S.P.Q.2d 1046.
67.

See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2005).

68.

See id

69.

Id.

70.

See id
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to decide the appeal with respect to the group of claims as to the
ground of rejection on the basis of the selected claim alone.'
However, apparently in direct response to the McDaniel
decision, the PTO has attempted to shift the burden back onto the
appellant to separately argue any claims that do not stand or fall with
the other rejected claims. 2 The rule states, "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of this paragraph, the failure of appellant to
separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together shall
constitute a waiver of any argument that.the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately.,73 In appellant's brief,
any claim argued separately should be placed under a subheading
identifying the claim by number, and claims argued as a group should
be placed under a subheading likewise identifying those claims by
number.74 The rule cautions that a "statement which merely points out
what a claim recites will not
be considered an argument for separate
75
patentability of the claim.,
In the wake of these revisions to the rules, the continuing
viability of McDaniel has been questioned.76 In its response to
comments submitted before the new rule was enacted, the PTO
explained that the waiver provision of Rule 41.37 reflects the view
expressed in Chief Judge Mayer's dissent in McDaniel, where he
stated:
McDaniel is the master of his own case ... and in stating that
claims 53-64 stand or fall together, he has waived any argument
that claims 55-57 are patentable for reasons independent of claim
53. Therefore, I would hold him to his
position, as the Board of
77
Patent Appeals and Interferences did.
71.
Id.
72. See id.
73. Id. (emphasis added). See also MPEP, supra note 6, § 1205.02, at 1200-15 (8th ed.,
3d rev., Aug. 2005) (citing In re McDaniel, 293 F.3d 1379, 1384, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1462, 1465-66
(Fed. Cir. 2002)).
74. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2005). See also MPEP, supra note 6, § 1205.02, at
1200-15 (8th ed., 3d rev., Aug. 2005) (providing examples of acceptable headings for claims
that are grouped together and those which are argued separately, and indicating that the best
practice is to use a subheading for each claim for which separate consideration by the Board is
desired.)
75.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2005). But see 37 C.F.R. § 1.192(c)(7) (2004), removed
by Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, 69 Fed. Reg. 49,960
(Aug. 12, 2004) ("Merely pointing out differences in what the claims cover is not an argument
as to why the claims are separately patentable.").
76. Hyatt v. Dudas, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2005).
77. McDaniel, 293 F.3d at 1387, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1468 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting). See
Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, 69 Fed. Reg. 49,960,
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Judge Mayer's comments are clearly at odds with the majority of
the Court, however, which held that the Board erred in selecting claim
53 as a representative claim for purposes of deciding the appeal of
claims 55-57 because claims 53 and 55-57 did not share a common
ground of rejection.78 As previously noted, the Federal Circuit held
that the Board does not have "carte blanche to ignore the distinctions
between separate grounds of rejection and to select the broadest claim
rejected on one ground as a representative of a separate group of
claims subject to a different ground of rejection. 79 In doing so, the
Court made it clear that the appellant has a right to have each of the
grounds of rejection relied on by the Examiner reviewed
independently by the Board.8 °
As a result, it is doubtful that the courts would hold that new
Rule 41.37 allows the appellant to waive this important right and
relieves the Board of its duty to review the examiner's grounds of
rejection and verify that the appellant has not incorrectly grouped
together claims that were not subject to a common ground of
rejection. Accordingly, McDaniel likely remains good law, and any
waiver will be deemed effective only to the extent that claims
grouped together are subject to the same grounds of rejection by the
examiner.
D. The Representative Claims Procedure Utilized DuringAn
Appeal To The Board Remains Limited In Practice
While the regulations create a representative claims procedure
that may be implemented when an applicant appeals to the Board, it is
a process that remains limited in practice. The applicant may choose
to argue claims separately or as a group. 8 1 The Board may decide the
appeal on the basis of a single claim only when the applicant elects
group treatment for multiple claims subject to the same ground of
rejection. 82 Further, based on the Court's holding in the McDaniel
case, even where an applicant erroneously contends that claims stand
or fall together, the Board may not rely on the applicant's statement
where all claims were not rejected for the same reasons.8 3 Any waiver

49,978 (Aug. 12, 2004).
78. McDaniel, 293 F.3d at 1384, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465.
79. Id.at 1384, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465-66.
80. Id.at 1384, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1466.
81.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2005).
82. See id
83. See McDaniel, 293 F.3d at 1384, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465.
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of separate treatment will be effective only to the extent that the

claims in question were subject to the same grounds of rejection. 4
III. REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS IN LITIGATION
In patent infringement litigation, it has become a relatively

common practice for the outcome of a case to be determined on the
basis of a few representative claims selected by the patent owner. 85 In
many patent cases, the parties will voluntarily stipulate or agree to the

use of representative claims, as an accommodation intended to narrow
the issues in the litigation.8 6 In other instances, however, the patent
owner may be ordered by the trial court to select representative
claims. 87
It has been argued that the use of representative claims is

warranted when there are a multitude of claims at issue, in order to
eliminate unnecessary, repetitious discovery and proofs and to reduce
the complexity and duration of discovery, trial preparation and the
trial.8 8 The purpose of representative claims is to allow "an efficient
and manageable trial," and "to enable a jury to adequately perform its
duty., 89 Representative claims are intended to "prevent confusion"

84.

See id.at 1384, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465.

85.

See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 1329, 1331, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d

1266, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The term 'representative claims' is well understood in patent
litigation.").
86.
See, e.g., Technitrol, Inc. v. U.S., 440 F.2d 1362, 1363 n.1,169 U.S.P.Q. 732 n.1 (Ct.
Cl. 1971 ) ("The parties have agreed that four claims... are representative of the claimed subject
matter of the patent, and therefore the scope of the patent can be determined by reference to
those claims."); Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 974 F. Supp. 1056, 1061 (E.D.
Mich. 1997) (parties agreed to try their case on the basis of representative claims, and resolution
of those claims would "constitute a final resolution of all the asserted patents as if the case had
been tried without representative claims"); Thomson, S.A. v. Quixote Corp., 166 F.3d 1172,
1173, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (parties agreed to base outcome of trial on
representative claims); Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 35 Fed. Appx. 918, 920-921
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
87.
See Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P., No. 01-CV-09871
RGK (RCx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23553, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2003) ("Due to the large
number of patents and claims at issue,..., the Court ordered Katz to identify no more than three
representative claims per patent for its infringement case and no more than twenty claims for a
claim construction hearing.").
88.

See, e.g., PATENT LAW PRIMER, supra note 5,§ 5, at 21 (1998).

89.
Keams v. Gen. Motors Corp., Civ. No. 85-70461, at 4, 8 (E.D. Mich. July 27, 1993)
(memorandum order explaining reasons for dismissal of case) (quoting Kearns v. Gen. Motors
Corp., Civ. No. 85-70461 (E.D. Mich. April 21, 1993) (order restricting cause of action to not
exceed one representative claim per patent-in-suit and to not exceed five representative General
Motors circuits)).
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and to prevent the trial of a patent infringement action from becoming
unduly protracted. 90
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide some general
authority for the creation of the representative claims procedure. The
fundamental purpose of the Federal Rules is to secure "the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination" of civil actions brought in the
district courts. 9' Courts are vested with an inherent power to manage
their affairs as an independent branch of government. 92 Federal Rule
16(c) empowers the district courts to take appropriate actions
intended to simplify the issues, avoid unnecessary proof and
cumulative evidence, adopt special procedures for managing
potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex
issues, and otherwise facilitate the just, speedy and inexpensive
93
disposition of the action.
A.

A Finding Of Invalidity Of The Representative Claims Will
GenerallyApply To All Other Asserted Claims As Well

The Patent Act requires an independent analysis of the validity
of each claim in a patent.94 Unlike an appeal from a final rejection by
the examiner, where claims will stand or fall together if the patentee
elects to treat them as a group, in the district courts the validity of
each claim must be adjudged separately.95 Each claim is presumed
valid independent of the validity of the patent's other claims. 96 The

90.

PATENT LAW PRIMER, supra note 5, § 5, at 21 (1998).

91.

FED. R. Civ. P. 1.

92.
In re Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1441 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Roadway Express, Inc.
v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-66 (1980); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)
(district courts have an inherent power to exercise the control necessary to manage their own
affairs in order to achieve "the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases").
93.

FED. R. Civ. P. 16.

94.
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) ("A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent
(whether in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid
independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be
presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim.").
95.
CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 8, § 8.06[5][d], at 8-271 (quoting Shelcore, Inc. v.
Durham Indus., 745 F.2d 621, 624-25, 223 U.S.P.Q. 584, 586-87 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
96.
Nevertheless, the court will not consider separately claims that were not considered
separately below. Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 799 n.5, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1097, 1101 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (failure to argue the validity of dependent claims
separately from the validity of an underlying independent claim precludes consideration of that
matter on appeal). Claims not argued separately will stand or fall together on appeal. Sibia
Neurosciences Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1359, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1927, 1933
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1016,
1026 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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burden is on the party challenging the validity of the claims
to show
97
by clear and convincing evidence that the patent is invalid.
Accordingly, the general rule is that a party cannot show that all
claims of a patent are invalid by presenting evidence directed at only
one claim. 98 A party challenging the validity of a claim, absent a
pretrial agreement or stipulation, must submit evidence supporting a
conclusion of invalidity for each contested claim. 99 However, where
the parties stipulate to representative claims, a validity resolution for
the representative claims will generally apply to other claims as
well.100
In Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Manufacturing Co., the Court
rejected the defendant's argument that a finding of validity of the
representative claims did not extend to the remaining claims. 10 1 The
court observed that the term "representative claims" was well
understood in patent litigation, and the procedure to be followed was
familiar to any experienced patent litigator. 102 At the time of trial, the
97. HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.IV, at 52 (4th ed. 2003)
(citing Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int'l, 316 F.3d 1331, 1339, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)).
98. Gardner v. TEC Sys., Inc., 725 F.2d 1338, 1339 n.1,
220 U.S.P.Q. 777, 778 n.1 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (trial court erred in adjudging the patent in suit as invalid for obviousness under §
103 where only claims 1, 3, 4 and 8 were tried by the parties and considered by the court; the
trial court's decision must be limited to the claims in suit). See also ROBERT L. HARMON,
PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 19.3(g), at 1096 (6th ed. 2003) ("Each claim of a patent
is presumed valid independently of the validity of any other claim. For this reason, where a
defendant does not counterclaim for invalidity of all claims, a judgment of invalidity
encompassing all claims must be reversed where it appears that the validity of certain claims
was not actually litigated at trial.").
99. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 942, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1119, 1124 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (quoting Shelcore, 745 F.2d at 625, 223 U.S.P.Q. at 586-87).
100. Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 879, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1123, 1129
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (district court did not err in holding that the claims dependent upon a claim
found to be invalid for obviousness were likewise invalid). In Miles, the parties entered into a
stipulation which provided, "The '460 patent contains seven claims. Claim 1 is the only
independent claim. Claims 2 through 7 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1.
Consequently, claim 1 is the broadest claim and can be considered to be representative of the
claims in this patent." Id. at 879, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1129. See also Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. COBE
Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1057, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1437, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Where the parties
stipulate to representative claims,... a validity resolution for the representative claims applies
to the other claims as well." (quoting Miles, 997 F.2d at 879, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1129)); N.V.
Akzo v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 810 F.2d 1148, 1152, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1704, 1708 (Fed Cir.
1987) (a finding of invalidity of a broad representative claim applied to all the other claims of
the patent in suit); IRWIN M. AISENBERG, MODERN PATENT LAW PRECEDENT, Representative
Claim, at 1044 (5th ed. 2003).
101.
See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 836 F.2d 1329, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1266 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
102. Indeed, the court commented that, "[flor Dennison to suggest at this point that the
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stipulation was understood by the parties, their counsel and the court
to mean that four claims selected by plaintiff would represent all of
the claims in the case, and whatever result the court reached as to
those four claims would be the result for all claims. 10 3 The
defendant's appeal was therefore dismissed as "an unquestionably
frivolous and flagrant abuse of the judicial process. ' 1°4
More recently, however, the Federal Circuit affirmed a district
court's ruling denying defendants' motion to extend a judgment of
invalidity of three asserted claims to all the remaining claims of the
patents in suit.10 5 The court observed that in a pretrial stipulation,
plaintiffs asserted infringement only as to three claims, and the
defendants asserted invalidity only as to those three claims.10 6 At trial,
the defendants did not offer evidence as to the invalidity of any other
claims in the patents in suit.' 0 7 Although plaintiffs' attorney stated at
trial that the representative claims would dictate the outcome, the
court understood his comments to be directed to infringement only,
and he did not address the issue of validity.' 0 8 As a result, the district
court's judgment of invalidity was properly limited to the claims
asserted at trial.' 0 9
Conversely, another court refused to preclude evidence relating
only to non-representative claims, even though the parties had
stipulated to a representative claims process. In W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Viskase Corp., the parties agreed that claims 1, 2 and 7 of the patent
court and the parties intentionally tried this case in a way that left unresolved the question of the
validity of 24 of the 28 claims plaintiff was asserting is outside the bounds of legitimate
advocacy," and it characterized the assertions of defendant's counsel before the district court as
"absurd" and "disappointing." Id. at 1331, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1268.
103. Id. at 1330, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1267 (quoting Judge Grady's memorandum opinion
dated September 11, 1987).
104. Id. at 1331, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1268. But see Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 776 F.2d
320, 327, 227 U.S.P.Q. 838, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (patent claims not at issue were improperly
held invalid, where SMEC did not counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of invalidity of all
claims).
105. Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. MDS Am., Inc., 413 F.3d 1301, 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1244,
1253 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
106. Id. at 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1253.
107. Id. at 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1253.
108. Id. at 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1253.
109. Id. at 1313, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1253; see also Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz
Tech. Licensing, L.P., No. CV 01-9871-RGK (RCx) (C.D. Calif. Mar. 3, 2004) (order re
representative claims) (lack of specificity in the scheduling order creating the representative
claims process supported a conclusion that the representative claims were only a "test case"
designed to advance settlement of the entire dispute; there must be an agreement and
understanding between the parties about the significance of the representative claims if they are
to dispose of all causes of action).
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were representative of the claims at issue.'' 0 The defendant then
moved to exclude any evidence of validity or infringement regarding
any patent claim other than the three representative claims."' The
district court denied defendant's motion, stating that merely because
Grace agreed that three claims were "representative" did not mean
that Grace agreed that these three claims were "exclusive." ' 12 The
court held that the stipulation between the parties was not preclusive
in nature, and the defendant could not be permitted to bar evidence
relating to most of Grace's claims
through a "strained reading" of the
13
pretrial stipulation and order."
B. A DeterminationThat One Representative Claim Is
Infringed Will Generally Apply To All Asserted Claims
Just as the validity of claims must be determined on a claim-byclaim basis, infringement must likewise be adjudged with respect to
each individual claim.' 14 "Infringement generally exists if any one ' of
15
a patent's claims covers the alleged infringer's product or process."
Nevertheless, as with determinations of validity, a finding that the
representative claims are infringed will likely apply to the remaining
asserted claims as well.
For example, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, the
Court of Claims observed that the parties "have treated [claims 1 and
6] as representative of the claims allegedly infringed, and so shall
we. ' ,116 As a result, the court limited its analysis to those
representative claims and concluded that the plaintiff had no valid
110.

W.R. Grace & Co. v. Viskase Corp., No. 90 C 5383, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14651, at

*7 (N.D. Ill. October 15, 1991).
111.

Id.

112. Id.
113. Id.at*7-*8.
114. CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 8, § 18.03, at 18-71 ("Determination of
infringement requires a construction of the meaning of the claim language and then application
of the claims as construed to the accused product or process."); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("It is a 'bedrock principle' of patent law 'that the claims
of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude."');
Autogiro Co.of Am.v.U.S., 384 F.2d 391, 395-96, 155 U.S.P.Q.697, 701 (Ct.Cl. 1967) ("The
claims of the patent provide the concise formal definition of the invention.... It is to these
wordings that we must look to determine whether there has been infringement.").
115.
HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.I.C., at 158 (4th ed. 2003)
(citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996)). See also 35 U.S.C.
§ 288 (2000) ("Whenever, without deceptive intention, a claim of a patent is invalid, an action
may be maintained for the infringement of a claim of the patent which may be valid.").
116.

1982).

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S., 670 F.2d 156, 161, 214 U.S.P.Q. 857, 861 (Ct. Cl.
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claim against defendant for patent infringement because the invention
when McDonnell Douglas first
had not yet been reduced to practice
117
government.
the
to
disclosed it
Nevertheless, a finding of infringement may not extend to claims
that were not actually asserted in the action. In Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v.
Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., the parties
stipulated that claim 25 was representative of claims 25-31, the only
claims that were litigated.1 18 Tol-O-Matic, the alleged infringer, only
requested jury findings on claim 25.119 After claims 25-31 were found
not infringed, Tol-O-Matic asserted that claims 1-24 and 32 had also
been placed in issue by the pleadings and that the judgment of
noninfringement should have included these claims.120 The court
disagreed and stated that pleadings do not suffice to support a
judgment when the subject matter was not litigated, or fairly placed in
There must be sufficient and explicit notice of
issue, during the trial.
121
the claims at risk.
C. It Is UnclearHow Courts Will Treat Cases With Mixed
Findings Of Validity And/Or Infringement
It is relatively clear that a finding of validity or infringement
relating to the representative claims will apply to the remaining
asserted claims.' 22 However, the outcome seems less than certain
where a trial court finds either that only some of the representative
claims are valid and that others are invalid, or that only some of the
representative claims are infringed and others are not. 123 It is unclear
precisely how courts will apply a split outcome to the other asserted
claims. 124
In Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-GraphicsCorp., the
parties addressed the possibility of a split outcome in their stipulation
See id. at 163, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 862.
118.
Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d
1546, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991), abrogated by Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (abrogating on other grounds).
Tol-O-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1554, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1339.
119.
117.

120.

Id. at 1554, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1339.

121.

Id. at 1554-55, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1339-40.

122.

See supra Section 11-A and II-B.
See supra Section II-A and II-B.

123.

Statistical data indicates that a split decision of this sort may be an unlikely result in
124.
any event. See John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents,26 AIPLA Q. J. 185, 245 (1998). In 86.7 percent of cases reviewed involving
multiple patents in suit, the patents in the case were either all held valid together or all held
invalid together. Id. Courts produced "mixed" results in only 13.3 percent of cases. Id.
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There, the parties

Representative claims in suit are nos. 1, 4, 5 and 13. If any of said
claims is held to be valid and infringed by the accused machine,
plaintiff shall be entitled to an injunction restraining defendant
from infringement of such claim all other claims of the patent in
suit that are generally similar to it; whereas if none of claims 1, 4,
not assert
5 and 13 is held valid and infringed, then plaintiff will
126
that any other claim of the patent in suit is infringed.

Notably, although the court found that claims 1, 4, 5 and 13 were
valid and infringed, and it awarded injunctive relief and treble
of the patent
damages, the court did not consider which other claims
27
were "generally similar" to the representative claims.1
Even in the relatively unlikely event of a mixed decision,
collateral estoppel may apply to nonlitigated claims of a patent where
the issue of invalidity common to each action is substantially
identical. 28 "It is the issues litigated, not the specific claims around
which the issues were framed, that is determinative." 129 As a result,
where only some of the representative claims are found to be invalid,
the patent owner may nevertheless find that it is collaterally estopped
from litigating the validity of other, non-representative claims in the
future.
D. A FindingOf Invalidity Of Representative Claims May
Extend To Claims Not Asserted In The Action
In Blonder Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation,the Supreme Court held that a judgment of invalidity in a
suit against one infringer accrues to the benefit of any other accused
infringer unless the patent owner shows that it did not have a fair
opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially to pursue its
claim the first time. 130 Moreover, Blonder-Tongue has been extended
to claims not actually adjudicated as invalid, to the extent those

125. Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 680 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1982).
126. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
127. See id. at 485-86.
128. Westwood Chem., Inc. v. U.S., 525 F.2d 1367, 1372 (Ct. C1. 1975).
129. Id.
130. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333 (1971);
CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 8, § 19.02[2][a], at 19-52.
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issues that are common to claims previously found to
claims present
131
be invalid.
In Bourns, Inc. v. United States, the Court of Claims explained

that it made sense to extend the Blonder-Tongue ruling to claims that
have not been litigated, because the nature of patentees is to seek
multiple duplicative claims. 3 2 "Courts have long recognized that the
claims of a patent may be repeated and duplicated, varying one from
the other only in certain minor details.' 3 3 Claims may be multiplied
because there are several facets to an invention or because the
applicant hopes to define the scope of the invention in different
ways. 134 However, the court observed:
The realities of patent practice suggest that, merely because the
invention, the patentee's contribution to the art, is presented in
varying language or varying combinations of elements does not
necessarily mean that the issues bearing on the nonobviousness of

that concept or contribution vary from one claim to the next. ...
That each of several differently worded claims may present
identical issues is apparentfrom the rather common practice of
selecting representativeclaims andstipulatingthat the validity of a
group of claims mayv be determined on the basis of the
representativeclaims.

The court then held that a finding of validity is applicable to
unadjudicated claims where it is shown that136the adjudicated and
unadjudicated claims presented identical issues.
As a result, a finding of invalidity of the representative claims
will likely extend not only to other claims that were asserted by the
patentee in the litigation, but also to unasserted claims to the extent
that identical issues are involved. 137 Further, it is unlikely that a
See Boums, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 486, 187 U.S.P.Q. 174 (Ct. Cl. 1976); see
131.
also CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 8, §§ 19.02[2], at 19-51, 19.02[2][c], at 19-63.
132. See Bourns, 537 F.2d at 491-92, 187 U.S.P.Q. 178-79.
133. Id. at 491, 187 U.S.P.Q. at 178.
134. Id. at 492, 187 U.S.P.Q. at 178.
135. Id., 187 U.S.P.Q. at 178-79 (emphasis added).
136. Id., 187 U.S.P.Q. at 179.
137. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., L.P., No. CVS-01-701-PMP (RJJ) (D. Nev. May 27, 2004) (order denying motion to alter or amend
judgment). The district court's findings and conclusions regarding lack of enablement applied to
all of Lemelson's patent claims. Id. at 3-4. The evidence supporting a finding of lack of
enablement applied to Lemelson's "invention" and not merely to any representative claim or
asserted claim at issue. Id. at 4. Collateral estoppel therefore precluded Lemelson from
relitigating this issue. Id.
Similarly, the court's finding of infringement was not limited to the 76 representative claims:
"Under the claim interpretation made by the Court, none of the remaining patent claims could be
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patent owner could successfully argue that such collateral estoppel
effect should not apply to unasserted claims because the
determination of invalidity was reached in a case tried on the basis of
representative claims. Although Blonder-Tongue lists a number of
factors that are relevant to a determination of whether a patentee had a
"fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evidentially to
pursue his claim," 138 the courts have been extremely reluctant to find
that a patent owner did not enjoy a full and fair opportunity to litigate
139
its claims.
E.

Courts Are Skeptical OfArguments Contending That A
Court-ImposedRepresentative Claims Process Violates The

Patent Holder's ConstitutionalRights
In many cases, the parties will agree to try their entire case on
the basis of a few representative claims. 140 Although it has not
addressed the question directly, the Federal Circuit apparently
believes that district courts also have the authority to order a patent
owner to designate representative claims that will determine the
outcome of all claims asserted. 14 1 For instance, in ReRoof America,
Inc. v. United Structures of America, Inc., plaintiff ReRoof argued
that the trial court abused its discretion by forcing it to select five
representative claims (i.e., a single claim from each of the five
patents-in-suit) out of the 18 "illustrative" claims that ReRoof was
previously ordered to designate. 42 ReRoof claimed that limiting it to

infringed because all of the remaining claims contain one or more limitations construed by the
Court to lead to a finding of noninfringement." Id. Collateral estoppel therefore precluded
relitigation of those issues as well. Id.
138. Some of the factors relevant to this determination include: (1) whether the patentee
was the party instituting the prior suit and chose the forum; (2) whether the patentee had an
incentive to conclude the litigation against the defendant in the prior case; (3) whether the first
validity determination was based on the standards announced in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1 (1966); (4) whether the decisions of the district court and appellate court indicate that
those courts "wholly fail to grasp" the technical subject matter of the patents and the issues in
the suit; and (5) "whether without fault of his own the patentee was deprived of crucial evidence
or witnesses in the first litigation." See CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 8, § 19.02[2][b], at 1954.

139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Technitrol, Inc. v. U.S., 440 F.2d 1362, 169 U.S.P.Q. 732 (Ct. Cl. 1971);
Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 974 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Mich. 1997);
Thomson, S.A. v. Quixote Corp., 166 F.3d 1172, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
141.
See Reroof Am., Inc., v. United Structures of Am., Inc., Nos. 98-1378, 98-1430, 1999
WL 674517 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 30, 1999).
142. Id. at *4.
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proving the full range of the
only five claims disabled it from
143
activities.
infringing
defendant's
The Federal Circuit held that ReRoof failed to show that it was
prejudiced by the court-ordered reduction in the number of claims it
was allowed to present to the jury. 144 In the first place, ReRoof
acknowledged that the court did not err by initially requiring it to
reduce its claims for trial to the 18 illustrative claims. 145 Further, the
various claims of the five patents-in-suit overlapped "very
substantially," and the court observed that in light of the way the jury
disposed of the five tried claims, it was convinced there was no
reasonable likelihood that a trial including the 13 untried46 claims
would have resulted in a verdict affording ReRoof any relief.1
Likewise, in Kearns v. General Motors Corp., the Federal
Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing Kearns' case against General Motors (GM) with prejudice,
where Kearns ignored multiple district court orders requiring him to
identify which claims he was asserting and then to limit the asserted
147
claims to no more than one representative claim per patent-in-suit.
Instead of doing as the court required, Kearns indicated that he was
asserting every claim of every patent he owned, not just the five
patents-in-suit. 148 The district court considered other options before
dismissing the case, including allowing the special master to
designate a limited number of claims or having the trial court
designate the claims on its own, but it decided that dismissal was
more appropriate in light of Kearns' repeated refusal to obey pretrial
orders. 149 The Federal Circuit found that Kearns' refusal to prosecute
decision of the district court
prejudiced GM, and therefore 15the
0
dismissing the case was affirmed.
143.

Id.

144.

Id.

An order from the district court indicates that Reroof selected the 18 illustrative
145.
claims of its own volition, for purposes of its proposed claim construction. ReRoof Am., Inc. v.
United Structures of Am., Inc., No. 96-C-388-K, at 2 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 15, 1997) (order denying
motion to strike Reroof's Markman brief). Reroof originally asserted 63 claims from five
patents, and the district court directed it to limit the asserted claims. Id. at 2. Reroof responded
by identifying the 18 illustrative claims contained in its Markman brief. Id. It is therefore

unclear that ReRoof actually acquiesced in making the first cut, as the Court suggested.
146.

ReRoof 1999 WL 674517, at *4.

147.

Keams v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 93-1535, 1994 WL 386857 (Fed. Cir. July 26,

1994).
148.

Id. at*l.

149.

Id. at *3. See also Keams v. Gen. Motors Corp., Civ. No. 85-70461 (E.D. Mich. July

27, 1993) (memorandum order explaining reasons for dismissal of case).
150.

Kearns, 1994 WL 386857, at *4.
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While many patent owners will agree to try their cases on the
basis of representative claims, others may attempt to challenge the
trial court's right to require them to designate a few claims that will
be determinative of the outcome of the entire case. For instance, a
patent owner may view this requirement as a violation of its
Constitutional or other rights, or it could argue that it is entitled to a
full and fair hearing on each claim that it alleges to be infringed.
Serious questions may be raised concerning the trial court's ability to
impose a representative claims procedure on an unwilling patent
holder.
1. Courts Are Unlikely To Find That A JudiciallyImposed Representative Claims Process Violates The
Patent Owner's Due Process Rights
A patent owner who has been ordered by the trial court to
designate representative claims that will be determinative of its entire
action, and that may also have collateral estoppel effect on other
unasserted claims, may be tempted to argue that it has been deprived
of due process of law. Generally, due process requires that all litigants
be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. 151 In United States v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., the court observed, "Due
process requires that all conflicts over legal rights and obligations be
adjudicated in a court of law. ... No right is more basic than the right
to have a court of law adjudicate one's disputes.' 52
Depriving a patentee of the opportunity to present each of its
claims at trial could be viewed as the equivalent of depriving the
patent owner of its property rights in the independent inventions
embodied in each separate claim. The courts have traditionally
characterized patent as property rights. 153 Many years ago, the
Supreme Court stated, "A patent for an invention is as much property
as a patent for land. The right rests on the same foundation, and is
surrounded and protected by the same sanctions."' 154 The Patent Act
provides that a patent grants to the patentee "the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
151.

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950).
152.
U.S. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 705 F. Supp. 306, 314 (W.D. La. 1989)
(noting that arbitration is an exception to this rule, where the parties have consented to an
arbitration proceeding to determine their dispute).
153.

Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876).

154.
Id.;
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599, 225 U.S.P.Q. 243, 246 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (patent property rights "fall squarely within both classical and judicial definitions of
protectible property").
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throughout the United States."' 55 The right to exclude recognized56by a
patent is the essence of the concept of property rights generally. 1
The right to exclude others from using one's patent claims is,
therefore, a fundamental right of the inventor. "It is a property
right.., of which the patentee cannot be deprived without due
process of law."' 57 Further, each patent claim is a separate and
independent invention.' 58 For that reason, infringement and validity
59
analyses must be performed on a claim-by-claim basis.
Consequently, a patent owner who is forced to proceed on the basis of
representative claims may assert that he has been denied due process
of law.' 60 However, such an argument may not be compelling to the
courts.
In Bourns, the Court of Claims determined that collateral
estoppel applied to unadjudicated claims where it was shown that
adjudicated and unadjudicated claims presented identical issues. 161
The court observed:
In reaching that conclusion, recognition is given to plaintiffs
arguments regarding due process and the further argument that
155. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
156. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548, 220 U.S.P.Q. 193, 198 (Fed.
Cir. 1983); see also Patlex, 758 F.2d at 599-600, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 247:
The encouragement of investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose of the
patent grant, and is based directly on the right to exclude. As the Supreme Court
observed in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 100 S.Ct. 383,
391, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979), the "right to exclude others" is "one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property."
157. Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Wallace A. Erickson & Co., 627 F.2d 57, 59, 206
U.S.P.Q. 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 976,
41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1185, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (the principal value of a patent is its statutory right
to exclude; the right to exclude others from a specific market, no matter how large or how small,
is an essential element of the patent right).
158. See Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1528, 220 U.S.P.Q. 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
159. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1562, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Infringement of one valid and enforceable patent claim is all that is
required for liability to arise."); 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) ("Each claim of a patent (whether in
independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of
the validity of the other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid
even though dependent upon an invalid claim.").
160. Compare the situation where a plaintiff sues defendant for two separate breaches of
contract and five unrelated tort claims, and the trial court insists that the outcome of the entire
case will be determined by a limited trial on only one contract breach and one tort. There is little
chance that the appellate courts would tolerate such a result. The difference, of course, is that in
a typical patent infringement case, the claims-in-suit are often closely related and overlap
considerably.
161.
Bourns, Inc. v. U.S., 537 F.2d 486, 492, 187 U.S.P.Q. 174,179 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
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each claim is to be presumed valid and treated as a complete and
independent invention. However, by focusing on the issues of fact
and law necessary to a resolution of the obviousness issue, ... a
determination can be made whether the unadjudicated claims
present any new issues which, to afford due process, would require
a trial on the merits, or whether litigation on those claims would
simply be a 'repetitious lawsuit over matters which have once
already been decided.' ... Stated otherwise, if a patentee has once
been heard on all the factual issues necessary to an obviousness
determination, and that determination already has been made
adversely to one claim, neither due process nor any provision of
the patent statute would appear to require that the patentee be
heard once again on those same issues and on the same
obviousness determination simply because a different claim is
involved. It is believed that a proper application of Blonder162
Tongue should preclude just such relitigation of the issues.
As a result, a court would be unlikely to find that a judiciallyimposed representative claims process resulted in the denial of a
patentee's due process rights, when all issues relating to infringement
and validity were encompassed within the trial of the representative
claims. This holds true even where the representative claims were
determinative of all asserted claims and had collateral estoppel effect
over other unasserted claims.
2.

When The Trial Court Orders A Patent Owner To
Designate Representative Claims, Seventh Amendment
Arguments May Apply

A patentee who has been ordered by the trial court to limit its
case to a few representative claims may also potentially argue that it
has been deprived of its right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution.' 63 The Seventh
Amendment declares that in suits at common law, "the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved."' 164 In Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., the Supreme Court observed, "There is no dispute that
infringement cases today must be tried to a jury, as their predecessors

162.
163.

Id.
See Brian D. Coggio and Timothy E. DeMasi, The Right to a Jury Trial in Actions for

Patent Infringement and Suits for DeclaratoryJudgment, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &

ENT. L.J. 205 (Autumn 2002). See also 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2000) ("A patentee shall have remedy
by civil action for infringement of his patent."); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) ("When damages are
not found by a jury, the court shall assess them.").
164. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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were more than two centuries ago. 165 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court then held that the interpretation of the words of a patent claim
thus severely circumscribing the
is a matter for the court, not the jury,
1 66
role of the jury in patent litigation.'
In In re Lockwood, an important but non-precedential decision,
the Federal Circuit made clear that a patentee has a right to trial by
jury when legal, as opposed to equitable, rights are at issue. 167 The
Court explained that, in order to determine whether a particular action
involves legal or equitable rights, "we examine both the nature of the
issues involved and the nature of the remedy sought."' 68 The test for
statutory actions such as patent suits involves two steps: "First, we
compare the statutory action to 18th century actions brought in the
courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.
Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is
legal or equitable in nature."' 69 Thus, if a particular action involves
either the adjudication of legal rights or the implementation of legal
remedies, the district court must honor a request for a jury trial to the
extent such a request has been made and disputed issues of fact exist.
The Court concluded that the patentee was entitled to a jury trial as a
matter of right on the defendant airline's counterclaim for a
declaration that the patents-in-suit were invalid, because the
infringement sought both money
patentee's complaint for patent
170
damages and injunctive relief.
It is therefore clear that, in those cases where the patentee is
seeking an award of money damages, it has a right to try its case to a
jury. The Supreme Court has stated that "[m]aintenance of the jury as
165. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996). Note that in
Markman, the plaintiff was seeking an award of money damages. Id. at 376.
166. Id.at391.
vacated, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995). Note
167. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 972 (Fed.Cir.),
that in Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1340, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385,
1391-92 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the Federal Circuit observed that it provided a relevant and detailed
analysis of the right to trial by jury in a patent infringement action in the Lockwood opinion.
The Supreme Court vacated Lockwood without explanation. "Thus our analysis has been neither
supplanted nor questioned. Although no longer binding, we find it's reasoning pertinent." Id. at
1340, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1391-92.
168. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 972.
169. Id. (quoting Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990)). See also
Markman, 517 U.S. at 377.
170. Subsequently, in Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1341, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1392, the Federal Circuit
held that a defendant, asserting only affirmative defenses and no counterclaims, does not have a
right to a jury trial in a patent infringement suit if the only remedy sought by the plaintiffpatentee is an injunction. Because the action was equitable in nature and the only remedy sought
(an injunction) was equitable, there was no right to a jury trial.
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a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place
in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the
right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.' 71 The
patent owner who has been forced by the court to try its case on the
basis of a few representative claims may therefore be able to
successfully argue that it has been deprived of its rights under the
Seventh Amendment because the court has not permitted it to present
its claims to the jury. 172 However, it may also run squarely into the
same types of arguments that would defeat a claim for denial of due
process - if all relevant issues relating to validity and infringement
are heard by the jury,
it may be determined that the patentee has had
17 3
his day in court.

3. Courts Should Limit The Use Of Representative Claims
To Those Cases Where The Parties Agree To Be Bound
By That Procedure
Given the serious nature of the questions that exist concerning
the propriety of the representative claims process, courts would be
well advised to limit the representative claims process to those

171.
Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 970 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
172. The plaintiff in ReRoof Am., Inc. v. UnitedStructures ofAm., Inc., Nos. 98-1378, 981430, 1999 WL 674517 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 30, 1999), made a similar argument. ReRoof contended
that it was "prejudiced" by the trial court's order requiring it to present five representative
claims to the jury; it argued on appeal that the trial might have resulted in a different verdict if it
had been permitted to present all, or at least some, of the other claims contained in the five
patents-in-suit. Id. at *4.The court declined to address this question, however, and found that
ReRoof had already acknowledged that the trial court was within its rights when it initially
instructed ReRoof to select 18 illustrative claims on which to proceed. Id.ReRoof could not
later complain that it was prejudiced by the order requiring it to designate five representative
claims from the group of 18 illustrative claims previously selected. Id.
173. Professor Adelman casts serious doubt on the wisdom of trying any patent case to a
jury:
Juries are not helpful in patent cases. Federal district court judges are much better
equipped to make accurate fact findings in complicated patent cases than lay
juries. The notable advantages such judges have include greater intelligence and
training, coupled with the ability to control the pace of the trial and to study
transcripts and documents outside the courtroom both during and after trial,
giving them a far greater ability to absorb the needed facts. Moreoever, the side
with the weak case has every incentive to use its preemptory challenges to rid the
jury of any potential juror likely to understand the issues while it is more difficult
to rid yourself of the burden of an able judge if you have a weak case.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN, PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 7.6[2.-1] at 7-188 (2d ed. 2003). He
further states that "juries in patent cases greatly complicate the functioning of the patent system
and present the greatest single obstacle to its just administration." Id. at 7-195. Query then
whether the patent owner really wants to exercise his right to trial by jury in a complicated
infringement action involving multiple claims.
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instances where the parties express a willingness to try their case on
the basis of representative claims. Courts should exercise caution in
compelling parties to engage in a representative claims procedure
where the parties express reluctance to do so. In cases involving
reluctant parties, courts should attempt to have the parties consent to
be bound by the process.
Trial judges should have the parties reach agreement on a limited
number of representative claims 174 "Although both sides will resist for
fear of possibly giving up something, the narrowing process can and
does work effectively."' 75 The court should encourage the defendant
to agree that if it is found liable for infringing the representative
claims, and those claims are not invalid, the finding of infringement
will be applicable to all asserted claims. The plaintiff should be
encouraged to agree that if it loses on the representative claims, it will
lose on all claims. The parties may also reach consensus about what
effect, if any, a damages award will have on the other asserted claims,
and they may consent to try their case on the basis of a few
representative models of defendant's products. The court should
allow the parties to propose the representative claims and models that
will decide the case, and it should become involved only where the
parties cannot come to an agreement. Thus, the representative claims
procedures should be characterized by minimal court involvement and
should focus on crafting an agreement where1 76the risks are shared
equally between the plaintiff and the defendant.'
F. The Representative Claims Process May Provide The Best
Means Of PresentingAn UnderstandableCase To The Judge
And Jury

Several commentators have stressed the advantages of avoiding
the often complex and confusing process of applying patent claims to
an accused activity.17 7 Cases are often decided by conscious or

174.

PATENT LAW PRIMER, supra note 5,§ 5, at21 (1998).

175.

Id.

176.

Id. at 21-22. See also DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX

LITIGATION § 33.23, at 653 (4th ed. 2005) ("Cases involving multiple patents, each with
multiple claims, can be a source of confusion, resulting in unduly lengthened and expanded
pretrial and trial proceedings. Consider encouraging the parties to agree to proceed on a limited
number of representative claims and disputed models, so that findings regarding infringement on
the representative claims will apply to all claims. This may simplify the action and reduce jury
confusion.").
177.

See HORWITZ & HORWITZ, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE & TACTICS § 8.01[2],

at 8-6.1 to 8-7.
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unconscious substitution of a more convenient definition of the
invention for the terms in which it is expressed in the patent.' 78
When the patent owner presents a simple and straightforward
position which is clear in its basic aspects to the court, it falls to
the accused infringer to undertake the chore of dealing with the
details of the claims, an activity which may subject him to the
court's conclusion that reliance is being placed upon technicalities
and hair-splitting distinctions for the purpose of overcoming a
meritorious case. The decision by the patent owner to dispense
with an elaborate analysis of the claims as a part of the
presentation of his case in chief normally will not result in the loss
of an opportunity to make a record in this area, for the accused
infringer usually challenges the showing of infringement during
the presentation of his case in opposition.

A patent owner may therefore make a strategic decision that
voluntarily limiting its case to a few, carefully selected representative
claims may be its best chance of presenting a case that is
comprehensible to both judge and jury. 180 It has also been suggested
that, since the Markman decision, trying a case on the basis of a few
representative claims is advisable, since the
jury must now be
81
instructed on the interpretation of the claims. 1
G. A PatentOwner Has Several StrategiesAvailable For The
Selection OfRepresentative Claims

A patent owner who either consents to have its case tried on the
basis of representative claims, or who is ordered by the court to select
representative claims, will be faced with a number of different
competing considerations, including validity, enforceability, and
infringement of the patents-in-suit. On the one hand, the patentee will
want to designate a few narrow claims that it is confident will

178. Id. at 8-7.
179. Id.
180. The Horwitzes also argue that, in patent litigation, there is a potential hazard of
becoming lost in the details and losing sight of the goal. Id. § 6.0112], at 6-5. It is therefore
recommended that a dominant theme be established in every case. Id. They stress that, unlike a
proceeding before the PTO, the judge and the jury are usually possessed of little background in
the technical area in dispute. Id. at 6-6. Such arguments may also weigh in favor of the patentee
agreeing to try his case on the basis of representative claims.
181. David H. Binney and Toussaint L. Myricks, Patent Claim Interpretation After
Markman- How Have The Trial Courts Adapted?, 38 IDEA 155, 185 (1997) ("Because the jury
must now be instructed as to the interpretation of the claims, it may become more desirable to
try the case based on representative claims, or with special verdict forms aimed at establishing
whether individual elements common to more than one of the claims have been satisfied.").
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withstand any challenge to validity. Conversely, the patentee will also
want to select very broad claims, so that it will be satisfied that
infringement can be proven. If a plaintiff is limited to just a few
claims, it would be well advised to select the narrowest claims
possible where it is still reasonably certain that infringement can be
proven without casting doubt upon the validity of the patents.
In addition, the patent owner selecting representative claims
should also give consideration to the breadth of the injunction and the
potential damages award that it can reasonably expect to receive if it
proves that the selected claims are infringed. The patent owner should
evaluate the impact that a final judgment on the representative claims
will likely have on the defendant's business.
In order to maximize the amount of money damages it can
collect, the plaintiff patentee will want to select broad claims that will
encompass as many of defendant's products as possible. In addition,
the patent owner should select a few claims that are not newly issued,
if it wishes to collect damages for the full six years prior to filing the
complaint for infringement as authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2000).
However, if the patent owner wants to maximize the length of
injunction going forward after a finding of infringement, it will want
to choose claims from more recently issued patents that have many
years of life remaining. Again, in order to maximize the impact of an
injunction, the patentee should select claims that are sufficiently
broad to encompass as many of defendant's products as possible.
H. The Court And The PartiesMust Consider Timing In The
Selection Of Representative Claims
Another issue of concern to both parties is the point in the case
when representative claims should be designated. The patent owner
will want to select its representative claims fairly late in discovery, so
that it can accumulate as much information as possible about the
accused products or methods before designating the claims that will
be determinative of its action. If plaintiff is forced to select
representative claims too early in discovery, there is a danger that it
will make poor and uneducated choices and the claims will not be
truly representative.
The accused infringer, on the other hand, will undoubtedly argue
that it will be prejudiced if plaintiff does not have to identify
representative claims until the close of discovery. The defendant will
contend that it may incur huge costs in having its expert witnesses
evaluate infringement and validity of all asserted claims, rather than
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limiting these evaluations to a few representative claims. Similarly,
the defendant will object to conducting a prior art search that
encompasses all asserted claims, which could be extremely expensive
and time consuming.
Based on the considerations of both parties, a few guidelines can
be proposed for the timing of selecting representative claims.
Selection of representative claims should occur late in the discovery
period, but it should not necessarily be postponed until the very end
of discovery. In any event, representative claims must be identified
before either party's expert reports are due, and sufficiently in
advance of that date so that both party's experts will not be required
to perform expensive analysis of claims that will not be presented to
the jury. Identifying representative claims after the exchange of expert
reports would frustrate the purpose of simplifying the issues and
reducing the expense of the litigation. Likewise, selection of
representative claims should also predate the Markman hearing;
otherwise, the parties will be required to brief, and the court will be
required to construe, all asserted claims rather
than just those
82
representative claims on which the case will turn.'
IV. CONCLUSION
The Board and the courts frequently rely on representative patent
claims to determine the patentability or infringement of a larger group
of claims. This practice is justified as promoting efficiency and
reducing jury confusion.
An applicant for a patent may appeal to the Board following a
twice or final rejection and may elect to argue the patentability of
rejected claims separately or as a group. However, the Board may
decide the appeal on the basis of a single claim only when the
applicant elects group treatment for multiple claims subject to the
182. Note that the Patent Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California, which are frequently used as a model by other district courts
as well, make no provision for the designation of representative claims. PATENT L.R. (N.D. Cal.
2001). Local Rule 3-1 requires a party claiming patent infringement to serve on all parties a
Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Preliminary Infringement Contentions, which identifies each
claim of each patent in suit that is allegedly infringed by each opposing party not later than 10
days after the Initial Case Management Conference. PATENT L.R. 3-1 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Local
Rule 3-3 requires that, not later than 45 days afterward, each party opposing a claim of patent
infringement must serve its Preliminary Invalidity Contentions, which must include the identity
of each item of prior art that allegedly anticipates each asserted claim or renders it obvious.
PATENT L.R. 3-3 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Thus, the Local Rules actually provide for the exchange of
pleadings that address all claims of all patents, instead of just the select claims that will be
representative of all claims-in-suit.
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same ground of rejection. Even if an applicant erroneously groups
together claims that were not subject to the same ground of rejection,
it is unlikely that the Board would be permitted to construe the
applicant's statement as a waiver of separate treatment.
In patent litigation, a representative claims procedure may be
utilized as a result of an accommodation between the parties intended
to narrow the issues, or the selection of representative claims may be
required by the court to prevent a protracted trial. Generally, the
parties will agree that the outcome with respect to the representative
claims will be determinative of all issues in the litigation. However,
any determination of patent validity may also have collateral estoppel
effect on other, unasserted claims, where identical issues are
presented.
A disgruntled patent owner who has been ordered by the court to
select only a few representative claims may attempt to argue that it
has been deprived of due process or the right to a jury trial; however,
the ultimate success of such arguments is questionable. Courts will
likely determine that a patentee's rights have been satisfied if it has an
opportunity to be heard on all of the underlying issues, even if it is
prevented from arguing each asserted claim separately. As a result,
patent owners should take a number of factors into consideration
when selecting representative claims, including validity and
infringement, as well as the potential damages award or injunction
that may result from the claims that are designated. By strategically
selecting a few representative claims, the patent owner may best be
able to present a straightforward position that is comprehensible to
both judge and jury.
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